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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the credibility of exchange rate arrangements for the five African 
Portuguese-speaking (PALOP) countries. Our working hypothesis is that credibility 
necessarily implies low mean exchange market pressure (EMP), low EMP conditional 
volatility and low-severity EMP crises. In addition, economic fundamentals must account 
for EMP dynamics. We also seek evidence of a risk-return relationship for mean EMP and 
of “bad news” (negative shocks) having a greater impact on EMP volatility than “good 
news” (positive shocks). Using our econometric models, we are able to rank PALOP 
countries’ conditional volatility in ordinal terms. Our main conclusion is that countries with 
currency pegs, such as Guinea-Bissau (GB) and Cape Verde (CV), clearly have lower 
volatility when compared to those with managed floats and are therefore more credible. 
Moreover, EMP crises episodes under pegs are much less severe. We find that economic 
fundamentals correctly account for mean EMP in all countries and that the risk-return 
relationship is much more favourable for investors under currency pegs, as the increase in 
volatility is lower for the same rate of return. The exception to this finding is Mozambique 
(MOZ), which apparently has a risk-return profile akin to that enjoyed by countries with 
pegs. A plausible reason is that MOZ has the only managed float in our sample 
implementing monetary and exchange rate policy within the confines of an IMF 
framework, which establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for the central 
bank’s net domestic assets. This intuition needs to be tested, however. EMP conditional 
volatility is generally driven by changes in domestic credit (lowers it) and foreign reserve 
changes (raises it). The first effect is more pronounced under currency pegs, but also 
under MOZ’s managed float. “Bad news” increases volatility more that “good news” only in 
the case of CV’s currency peg, which we take to be another sign of its credibility. A few 
striking cross-country comparisons also emerge in our analysis. Among countries with 
managed floats, we find that Angola (ANG) has the most severe EMP crises whilst MOZ 
has the least severe. São Tomé & Princípe (STP), meanwhile, lies between these two 
extremes but its EMP crises behaviour is clearly much closer to that of MOZ. STP’s 
credibility may also be improving since its volatility has declined as of 2002 and its level is 
now much closer to that of MOZ, whose managed float has lowest volatility of such 
arrangements.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Global financial markets change the environment for economic policymaking, most visibly in 
the choice of exchange rate regime. When capital markets are integrated, the main issue 
becomes that of the relative importance attached to exchange rate stability and domestic 
monetary independence. At the heart of this issue is the so-called “impossible trinity” 
dilemma, which holds that a country can only attain two of the following three goals 
simultaneously: exchange rate stability, monetary independence and financial-market 
integration. Monetary independence is clearly greater under floating exchange rates, as the 
value of a currency is allowed to vary continuously in response to prevailing exchange 
market pressure (EMP), which reflects the excess demand for a currency arising when the 
total value of foreign goods and assets demanded by domestic residents is higher than that 
demanded by foreigners at the prevailing exchange rate. However, the benefit of greater 
independence has to be balanced against the cost of greater volatility and uncertainty in real 
exchange rates.  
 
For many developing countries, limiting exchange rate variability by fixing a domestic 
currency’s value to that of a sounder foreign currency is often seen as desirable. The reason 
is that fixing the exchange rate provides a nominal anchor that has two important benefits. 
First, it fixes the inflation rate for internationally traded goods, and so contributes to 
controlling inflation. Second, it anchors domestic inflation expectations to the anchor 
country’s inflation rate. As a result, domestic inflation falls in line with that of the anchor 
country, as do interest rates. Under free capital mobility, a credible currency-peg implies that 
a country has in effect adopted the anchor country’s monetary policy and, consequently, its 
low expected inflation. Under fixed exchange rates, the burden of adjustment to prevailing 
EMP thus falls exclusively on foreign reserves and interest rate changes.  
 
With respect to intermediate arrangements, a major policy debate in the literature is whether 
these are viable or not. Under such arrangements, EMP is relieved by some combination of 
changes in the exchange rate, in foreign reserves and in domestic credit. The focus on 
intermediate arrangements is particularly relevant given that almost all currency crises in the 
past decade took place against a background of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, i.e. 
arrangements allowing a step change in the value of a currency as a result of a discretionary 
decision by domestic monetary authorities. 
 
It is noteworthy that currency crises often became financial crises as sovereign credit ratings 
plummeted and access to international capital was lost following a currency’s collapse. In this 
regard, the East Asian “twin” financial and currency crashes of the 1990s underscored the 
relative ease with which it was possible to implement the “wrong” combination of currency 
pegs and economic policy under a given degree of financial-market integration. The 
commitment of authorities who seek exchange rate stability, through the adoption of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rate regimes, is therefore likely to be tested under financial-market 
integration.5 More recently, this policy debate has become more prominent in connection with 
the so-called “benign peg” of the Chinese currency to the US dollar.6  
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 The relevance of the European Payments Union is pointed out in Braga de Macedo & Eichengreen (2001c). The 
“Eurocentric” view has been presented as evidence of an intermediate exchange rate system which helps acquire 
financial reputation and is applied to the Franc zone and to Latin America in Braga de Macedo, Cohen & Reisen 
(2001b). The “Eurocentric” view essentially extends an interpretation of the first European attempts at promoting a 
multilateral payments system into an argument for improving regional monetary and fiscal surveillance. While the 
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not been tested directly, the European experience does signal when it is bound to be especially intense. 
6
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The literature also highlights the consensual view that policymakers will always have to take 
into account financial markets’ responses to their policy actions in seeking an optimal trade-
off between exchange rate stability and domestic monetary independence. After a country 
has chosen its exchange rate policy regime (fixed, floating, or fixed-but-adjustable) under a 
given degree of financial market integration, it then has the task of adapting its domestic 
economic policy and institutional environment in accordance with that choice. Indeed, the 
extent to which it is able to establish a credible interaction between a country’s financial-
market integration, exchange rate arrangements and the accompanying policy and 
institutional responses will be paramount in establishing its reputation in international 
financial markets.7  
 
For any country, establishing financial reputation is important for two reasons: First, it leads 
to a low-risk borrower profile and improved credit terms when seeking foreign capital, as 
reflected in its international credit rating. Second, it is conducive to low and more stable 
domestic interest rates, especially under fixed exchanges. Given that interest rates are an 
inter-temporal price, and, as such, heavily influenced by agent’s expectations, low interest 
rate spreads are considered to be an indicator of financial reputation. 
 
The range of reforms required to establish financial reputation is very broad, but the scrutiny 
of international lenders and credit rating agencies usually focuses on monetary and fiscal 
issues.8  Moreover, when the exchange rate regime is chosen based on a social concern for 
financial reputation, the choice is not necessarily restricted to the two corner solutions of a 
hard peg or a pure float.9 Intermediate regimes can thus be justified in spite of the logic 
behind the so-called “impossible trinity” dilemma, contrary to the dominant conventional 
wisdom of the late 1990s. Intermediate solutions do, however, raise the issue of the 
effectiveness and durability of capital controls, an issue we do not pursue here. 
 
The observation that acquiring financial reputation necessarily implies a positive interaction 
between financial-market integration, exchange rate regime and economic policy motivates 
our collective research interest. An additional motive is the absence of empirical studies that 
characterises existing literature, which is especially relevant in the case of many African 
countries. In the past, we researched the Portuguese Escudo’s entry into the Euro, the 
credibility of Macau’s currency board and of Cape Verde’s currency peg.10 Building upon our 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Dollar in a Globalised Economy”, where one of us commented on a presentation by Michael Dooley on Interest 
rates, Exchange Rates and International Adjustment based on a joint paper with David Folkerts-Landau and Peter 
Garber. The argument that, under a fixed exchange rate between the Yuan and the US Dollar, China becomes a 
periphery of the US is based on the persistence of effective capital controls between the two currency areas and 
on perfect substitutability between euro and dollar denominated assets. As discussed in Kouri & Braga de 
Macedo (1978) and Krugman (1981), these assumptions are questionable to the extent that there is imperfect 
substitutability between euro and dollar denominated assets and that capital controls are quickly eroded under 
financial globalisation. 
7
 For a central bank, credibility is usually associated with the perception of inflation aversion, even though other 
meanings such as incentive compatibility or pre-commitment have been pointed out. See Goldberg & Klein 
(2006).  
8
 Three related points come to mind in this connection. First, the design of reforms may help speed up the 
process of earning financial reputation, not least by sustaining the growth process, see Braga de Macedo & 
Oliveira Martins (2006). Second, the scrutiny mentioned in the text has been close enough to reveal a positive 
relationship between globalisation and governance, measured by trade flows and corruption indices in Bonaglia, 
Braga de Macedo & Bussolo (2001). Third, the international monetary system may help or hinder the process: an 
historical perspective between the gold and the euro standards is provided in Braga de Macedo, Eichengreen & 
Reis (1996). 
9
 Monetary transitions on the part of the new EU member states are therefore described as “float in order to fix” in 
Braga de Macedo & Reisen (2004). 
10
 Braga de Macedo (1996, 2001), Braga de Macedo, Catela Nunes and Covas (1999, 2004a), and using 
intervention data, Braga de Macedo, Catela Nunes & Brites Pereira (2003), and Brites Pereira (2005a, b); Braga 
de Macedo, Braz, Brites Pereira & Catela Nunes (2006); Braga de Macedo & Brites Pereira (2006); 
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past experience, we now intend to analyze exchange market pressure (EMP) for the case of 
African Portuguese-speaking, or Lusophone, countries, namely: Angola (ANG), Cape Verde 
(CV), Guinea-Bissau (GB), Mozambique (MOZ) and São Tome and Principe (STP), hereafter 
PALOP countries.11 While sharing a common development challenge, this group of countries 
encompasses different institutional options and economic policies.  
 
In particular, their exchange rate arrangements differ. ANG, MOZ and STP operate managed 
floats with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate. MOZ, in addition, has the only 
managed float that implements monetary and exchange rate policy within the confines of an 
IMF framework establishing floors for international reserves and ceilings for the central 
bank’s net domestic assets. CV and GB, meanwhile, both have pegs against the Euro. In the 
case of GB, this implies the absence of separate legal tender as it is a member of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), whose currency is the West African CFA 
franc.  
 
As such, it will particularly interesting to assess the credibility of exchange rate arrangements 
for each PALOP country. Our working hypothesis is that credibility necessarily implies low 
mean EMP, low EMP conditional volatility and low-severity EMP crises. In addition, economic 
fundamentals must account for EMP dynamics. We also seek evidence of the risk-return 
relationship for mean EMP and of “bad news” (negative shocks) having a greater impact on 
EMP volatility than “good news” (positive shocks), as discussed below. 
 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we measure EMP and identify crises 
episodes for each country. Section 3 looks at the stochastic properties of EMP and explores 
to what extent these can be explained by economic fundamentals. We present our 
conclusions in section 4. The appendix contains the country files, each containing tables and 
figures relating to EMP estimates, EMP descriptive statistics, EMP crises episodes, 
econometric results and diagnostics, and also the description of data used in the estimations. 
 
2. Measuring EMP 
 
The literature identifies two ways of measuring EMP.12 The first, following Girton & Roper’s 
(1977) seminal contribution, measures EMP as a weighted sum of changes in foreign 
reserves and exchange rate changes. The insight underlying this summary statistic is that 
exchange rate changes necessarily reflect a central bank’s passive adjustment to EMP while 
its purchases/sales of foreign assets are its active response. The precision weights adopted 
in this measure are typically estimated from a structural model of the economy, implying that 
these EMP measures are model-dependent.  
 
A second approach, proposed by Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz (1995, 1996 – ERW, 
hereafter), holds that model-dependency is undesirable given the tenuous connection 
between the exchange rate and economic fundamentals. As such, a model independent or 
ad-hoc EMP measure is calculated based on the channels through which EMP is relieved, 
which can include the interest rate channel unlike the first approach. EMP is measured as a 
weighted linear combination of these channels, where the precision weights are typically 
chosen so as to equalise the conditional volatilities of EMP measure’s constituent 
components.  
 
Our choice of summary statistic falls on the ERW approach for two reasons: first, the 
importance of the interest rate channel in altering the relative supply of domestic money vis-
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 The acronym is Portuguese for Portuguese-speaking African Countries. All five countries are also members of 
the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa - CPLP ).  
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 For a comprehensive review of EMP literature, refer to Weymark (1995, 98) and Spolander (1999). 
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à-vis foreign monies, especially under fixed exchange arrangements; second, the severe 
lack of data needed to estimate structural models, and hence model-based precision 
weights, for PALOP countries. As such, our EMP summary statistic assumes that the strain 
on a country’s external imbalance is absorbed by changes in the exchange rate (∆et13), in 
foreign exchange reserves (∆rt ) and in the interest rate differential ∆(it − i*t). It is calculated 
as a weighted linear combination of these observed changes: 
 
EMPt = ∆et + ηr ∆rt + ηi ∆(it −i*t ) 
 
In accordance with the ERW approach, we equalise volatilities of the EMP measure’s 
constituent components because one of the components will dominate EMP measures in the 
absence of this procedure.14 Here, ∆et is the reference variable and so the precision weights 
are calculated as ηr = −SD(∆et)/SD(∆rt) and ηi = SD(∆et)/SD(∆(it −i*t), where SD denotes the 
standard deviation of the variable under consideration. The weights take on the signs ηr < 0 
and ηi > 0 as central banks intervene by selling  (purchasing) foreign reserves in response 
positive (negative) EMP while the interest rate differential increases (decreases) as domestic 
interest rates are raised (lowered).  
 
Table 1 - EMP Descriptive Statistics (% per month) 
Country ANG CV GB MOZ STP 
Mean 5,06 -0,05 -0,01 -0,07 0,43 
SD 34,87 1,46 0,73 4,31 7,07 
Max 190,66 4,86 3,12 12,84 24,06 
Min -210,6 -5,31 -2.90 -19,85 -27,14 
Note: Statistics are calculated using the full sample. See the appendix for additional statistics. 
 
 
Figure 1 - EMP Mean (% p.a.) 
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               Note: Annual values are calculated as average of monthly EMP estimates. 
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 ∆et  > 0 denote exchange rate depreciations. 
14
  Recent research highlights that EMP summary statistics calculated using the ERW approach are sensitive to 
the assumptions regarding their constituent components (see Bertoli, et al., 2006 and also Li et al., 2006). The 
assumptions of relevance to our analysis have to do with the manner in which exchange rate variations are 
computed (exact formula versus logarithmic approximation), the different definitions of reserves (gross versus 
net), the constancy of precision weights over time and the choice of anchor currency. Our robustness analysis 
indicates that EMP summary statistics obtained under a different set of assumptions are broadly similar to the 
ones used in the analysis. As such, they will not change the ordinal ranking of PALOP countries’ conditional 
volatility presented here. The robustness analysis results, which also include estimated precision weights, are 
available from the authors upon request.   
6 
The descriptive statistics of our estimated EMP measures are given in Table 1.15 Looking at 
mean EMP values, we observe that CV, GB and MOZ are characterised by slightly negative 
EMP (close to zero) over the sample period, which is of a very similar order of magnitude for 
all these countries. The other two countries, meanwhile, have positive EMP but the mean for 
ANG is much larger than that of STP, as is also clear from Figure 1. The unconditional 
standard deviation and EMP range statistics allows us to refine this observation. Indeed, now 
we are able to classify the five countries into two distinct groups based on the ranking of 
these last two descriptive statistics. The countries with currency pegs clearly exhibit lower 
volatility and a smaller range of EMP variation. The countries with managed floats are much 
more volatile. ANG exhibits the greatest unconditional volatility (34.87%), followed by STP 
(7.07%) and then MOZ (4.31%). This classification is confirmed upon inspection of Figure 2, 
which shows the annual average of monthly EMP standard deviations for the two types of 
exchange rate arrangements.  
 
 
Figure 2a - EMP Unconditional Volatility (% p.a.) 
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Figure 2b - EMP Unconditional Volatility (% p.a.) 
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Next, we proceed to identify crisis episodes, which we take to be those EMP values 
exceeding some pre-established critical threshold. We bear in mind, however, that the 
definition of these thresholds entails using a discretional “rule of thumb”. As such, we 
consider three different thresholds to ensure a more robust analysis. A crisis episode is thus 
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identified when an EMP measure exceeds mean EMP by 1.5 SD, 2.5 SD and 3.5 SD 
respectively. Accordingly, we classify EMP crises as having a low, moderate or high severity. 
Note that these classifications will not correspond to the same magnitudes of EMP when 
comparing across countries, given their different levels of mean EMP. The EMP crises 
statistics are given in Table 2 while EMP crises tables for each country are provided in the 
appendix.16   
  
Table 2 - EMP Crises Statistics 
Country ANG CV GB MOZ STP 
Low  
EMP Mean  114,56% 3,26% 2.21% 9,48% 17,20% 
EMP SD 56.57% 1.13% 0.85% 2.80% 3.37% 
Crises 4 7 8 5 7 
Moderate  
Mean EMP -- 4.81% -- 12.05% 24.06% 
EMP SD -- 0.08% -- 1.13% -- 
Crises 2+ 2 1+ 2 1 
High 
Mean EMP 156.14% -- 4.22% -- -- 
EMP SD 48.82% -- -- -- -- 
Crises 2+ 0 1+ 0 0 
Note: The symbol (+) denotes that the same events are being considered in the calculations.   
 
Our first observation is that the number of crises varies across countries but not significantly. 
However, the severity of crises differs substantially. In the case of ANG, for example, we 
identify four crises at the lower threshold of which two are classified as severe. In contrast, 
GB experienced eight crises but only one of these was a high-severity crisis having a similar 
order of magnitude as CV’s single moderate-severity crisis. The finding that the severity of 
crisis differs substantially is reinforced when looking at the average values of EMP during 
crises episodes. GB and CV had positive EMP crises of magnitude 2.21% and 3.26% 
respectively at the 1.5SD threshold. The comparable figures for MOZ and STP are 9.48% 
and 17.20% while that of ANG is 114.56%.  
 
Two findings thus emerge from our crises analysis. First, EMP crises under currency pegs 
are much less severe than those under managed floats at all threshold levels. Second, ANG 
has the most severe EMP crises whilst MOZ has the least less severe ones among countries 
with managed floats. STP, meanwhile, lies between these two extreme but its EMP 
behaviour is clearly much closer to that of MOZ. We note that these findings corroborate 
those established in our descriptive analysis above. In order to better understand these 
findings, we now turn to the study of EMP’s stochastic properties in the next section.  
 
3. EMP Dynamics 
 
Our modelling approach is dictated by two concerns: first, we want to capture possible 
heteroscedasticity effects, volatility clustering and leverage effects associated with 
asymmetric responses shocks of the EMP series; second, we want to be able to compare 
EMP behaviour for the five PALOP countries within an economically meaningful framework. 
Given these objectives and following the modelling approach adopted in related work (Braga 
de Macedo et al. (2006), we estimate exponential GARCH in the mean (EGARCH-M) 
models. These models allow mean EMP to depend on its own conditional variance à la Engle 
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 In the tables, crises episodes are identified in bold type while the colours black, blue and red indicate that 
EMP exceeds the 1.5 SD, 2.5 SD and 3.5 SD thresholds respectively.  
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et al. (1987), thereby capturing the basic insight that risk-averse agents will require 
compensation for holding a country’s risky assets, especially as these are typically 
denominated in domestic currency. Given that an asset’s riskiness can be measured by the 
variance of returns, the risk premium is an increasing function of the returns’ conditional 
variance. The actual specification adopted is as follows: 
 
where єt  is the error disturbance term, assumed to have a zero mean and to be serially 
uncorrelated, and DΘ(0, 1) is a probability density function with zero mean and unit 
variance.17  
 
The EMP mean equation incorporates the effect of economic fundamentals, whose impact is 
captured by the k × 1 vector of explanatory variables xt (includes a constant term where 
necessary), with θ being the respective 1 × k coefficient vector. The risk-return relationship, 
meanwhile, is captured by the parameter µ. All explanatory variables are lagged one period 
in order to avoid the problem of contemporaneous simultaneity with the dependent variable. 
We also allow for ARMA (m, n) terms given the lack of data pertaining to economic 
fundamentals for all countries in our sample, as discussed below. In the conditional variance 
equation, st is an r × 1 vector of explanatory variables (includes a constant term), and λ is the 
respective 1 × r coefficient vector. Note that the left-hand side above is the logarithm of the 
conditional variance, which implies that the associated leverage effect is exponential rather 
than quadratic. In addition, forecasts of the conditional variance are guaranteed to be non-
negative under this specification. 
 
The literature identifies various macroeconomic fundamentals that could be considered as 
possible explanatory variables in our model. Some of these include:18 a) the rate of inflation, 
as it is associated with high nominal interest rates and may proxy macroeconomic 
mismanagement that adversely affects the economy (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1997); 
b)  the real exchange rate, given that currency over-valuations may deteriorate the current 
account and have historically been associated with currency crises (Berg et al., 1999); c) 
import and export growth which, when problematic, may lead to current account 
deteriorations that trigger currency crises (Dowling & Zhuang, 2000, Berg & Patillo, 1999); d) 
growth in monetary aggregates, e.g. excessive M1 growth might indicate excess liquidity 
and, hence, increased EMP that leads to speculative attacks (Eichengreen et al., 1995); e) 
domestic credit, given that high debt levels are conducive to banking sector fragility 
(Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1998); f) public debt, as higher public indebtedness is expected to 
raise vulnerability to a reversal in capital inflows, and hence to raise the probability of a crisis 
(Lanoie & Lemarbre, 1996). g) current account, as deficits are associated with large capital 
inflows, which indicate a diminished probability to devalue and thus lower the probability of a 
crisis (Berg & Patillo 1999); h) fiscal balance, as deficits are expected to raise the probability 
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 Optionally, Θ are additional distributional parameters that can be used to describe a distribution’s skew and 
shape. For a full discussion of this class of models, refer to Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986). In practice, we 
found that models were best estimated assuming normally-distributed errors.  
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 For more details, refer to Feridun (2007), who provides a useful summary that also includes several indicators 
describing banking sector vulnerability. See also Flood & Marion (1998). 
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of crisis since they increase the vulnerability to shocks and investor’s confidence (Demirguc-
Kunt & Detragiache, 1997). 
 
For PALOP countries, however, our choice of explanatory variables is severely restricted by 
the lack of data. At best, the publicly available data have a trimesterly or annual frequency, 
which is too low to use in our econometric models. More frequently, the data simply do not 
exist. In practice, we are able to use two fundamentals for the mean equation that have the 
desired monthly frequency (see the appendix for the data description): domestic credit 
growth rate (dct) and the real depreciation rate (qt).19 In the conditional variance equation, we 
include foreign reserve changes (rt) in addition to the afore-mentioned variables, given their 
important role in EMP dynamics, especially under currency pegs.20 For ANG, changes in oil 
prices are also used due to the importance of oil exports in its economy. Explanatory 
variables are lagged at least one period to avoid possible simultaneity bias in our 
estimations. The presence of a time trend in our monthly model of EMP is meant to capture 
the lower frequency trend that may exist in exchange rates due to aggregation of data, in 
particular, and omitted variables, in general.21  
 
Where appropriate, we test for the inclusion of dummy variables that are related to the 
occurrence of known economic events, e.g., CV's adoption of a currency peg in 1999:01, 
GB's implementation of its accession agreement with the WAEMU in 1997:05, etc. (see 
appendix the for dummy variable definitions). We also consider dummies that capture 
observed idiosyncratic events which clearly impact our estimations, e.g. the influx of MOZ's 
donor aid arrears in late 2004 and the subsequent need for depreciation of the MZM in 
2005:04/05. In the conditional variance equation, the dummy variables included are identified 
using Inclan & Tiao's (1994) CSUM test, which tests for structural breaks in volatility.  
 
Turning to the expected signs of the mean equation’s explanatory variables, domestic credit 
growth necessarily lead to greater EMP, hence estimated coefficients will be positive. On the 
other hand, real depreciation leads to lower EMP, implying that expected signs are negative. 
In an EMP context, the risk-return relationship implies that holding assets of a country in 
which EMP-volatility is high (large σ2t) should be compensated by a larger return (lower 
EMP), implying that µ is negative.22 Note also that µ is interpretable as the semi-elasticity of 
changes in EMP for a given percentage change in conditional volatility.  
 
As for conditional variance, the expected signs of the explanatory variables are not easily 
predictable a priori on theoretical grounds but their effects are easily interpretable upon 
estimation. In the case of foreign reserves, for example, a negative coefficient indicates that 
an increase in foreign reserves lowers conditional volatility. Finally, the impact of shocks is 
asymmetric if γ is different form zero while the presence of leverage effects can be tested 
under the hypothesis that γ is negative, which implies that negative shocks increase volatility 
more than positive ones of an equal magnitude.23 A plausible explanation for this asymmetric 
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 Note that it was not possible to calculate qt for STP due to lack of data regarding prices changes for this 
country.  
20
 Changes in reserves and in the interest rate differential are not included in the mean equation as they are 
already present in the EMP measure. 
21
 The first situation may lead to persistence that induces slight regime switching behaviour, due to agents’ 
perceptions of the market and of policy actions, and possibly by the exchange-rate policy stance. 
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 For exchange rates, the risk premium associated with the underlying volatility can be either positive or negative.  
Engel (1996), for example, shows that the direction of the effect of conditional variance on risk premiums depends 
on the variance of nominal consumption. Fukuta & Saito (2002), meanwhile, shows that the signs of the 
coefficients on risk premiums depend on the covariance between consumption growth and inflation, the inter-
temporal marginal rate of substitution, and the variances of inflation in Japan and the United States. 
23
 Standard GARCH models assume that positive and negative error terms have a symmetric effect on the 
volatility. i.e. good and bad news have the same effect. In practice this assumption is frequently violated, in 
particular by stock returns, as noted by Black (1976). A likely reason for stock returns' asymmetric leverage effect 
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leverage effect in the case of EMP is that risk perceptions of negative EMP tend to increase 
when upside volatility increases more than downside volatility. Moreover, this behaviour is to 
be expected mainly in mature financial markets, as opposed to those which are less 
sophisticated and underdeveloped.   
 
Our econometric analysis comprises the relatively short period of 1996:01 to 2005:09, as the 
adoption of a common analysis period required for cross-country comparisons reduces the 
effective sample size. In estimating our EGARCH-M models, we started with a general 
specification of the mean and variance equations. The orders of the variance equation and 
ARMA process in the mean equation were determined by the partial autocorrelation and the 
autocorrelation function of the EMP series. Non-significant variables are excluded from 
estimated equations where appropriate. We use the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) to 
assess a model’s relative fit, implying that we choose those models for which the (negative) 
SIC is smallest. The final EGARCH-M specifications are decided by looking at the properties 
of standardised residuals (SR) and squared standardised residuals (SSR).  
 
The models are estimated using E-Views 5.0, and we employ the Marquardt nonlinear 
optimization algorithm to compute maximum likelihood parameters. Bollerslev & Wooldridge 
(1992) note that maximising a mis-specified likelihood function in a GARCH framework 
provides consistent parameter estimates, even though standard errors will be understated. 
Accordingly, we use their consistent variance-covariance estimator to correct the covariance 
matrix. As such, we report asymptotic standard errors for estimated parameters which are 
robust to departures from normality.  
 
Correctly specified EGARCH-M models will have SR and SSR that are white noise, i.e. they 
are independent and identically distributed random variables with mean zero and variance 
one.  As model diagnostic tools, we use the modified Box-Ljung (B-L) procedure on the SR 
series to test for remaining serial correlation in the mean equation. To detect remaining 
ARCH effects in the variance equation, we use the B-L test as well as the ARCH-LM test on 
SSR. Based on the results of the diagnostic tests, we find ample support for our model 
specification. The B-L Q-statistics are insignificant at the 5% level for both the mean and 
variance equation, as are those of the ARCH-LM test.  
 
The summary of our EGARCH-M estimation’s results is given in Table 3.24 For all countries, 
we find economic fundamentals to be significant in the mean equation, as monetary 
expansions are associated with higher EMP while real exchange rate depreciations lead to 
lower EMP. The degree of response appears to differ across countries, however. Our 
estimations suggest that the effect of a 1% increase in domestic credit on EMP is greatest in 
CV (5.81%) and MOZ (3.60%, at lag 6).25 This finding apparently suggests that conditions in 
monetary and exchange rate markets are more closely related in CV and MOZ than in the 
other countries.  
 
The fact that we do not any find such evidence for GB is probably not unsurprising given the 
unit of analysis being considered. We are confident that were we to consider changes in 
domestic credit for whole of the CFA currency area, instead of only those in GB, similar 
evidence is likely to emerge. For ANG, the apparent weakness of linkages between these 
markets is reinforced by the fact that estimated coefficients are only significant at the 5% 
level, which contrasts with the case of other PALOP countries. With regards to real exchange 
rate depreciations, the evidence is broadly similar across countries with the exception of GB, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
is that negative returns imply a larger proportion of debt through a reduced market value of the firm, hence higher 
volatility.  
24
 Full estimation results and diagnostics are provided in the appendix. 
25
 A degree of caution must be exercised when interpreting this result, as changes in domestic credit that arise 
from monetary authorities' sterilisation activities cannot be identified using publicly available data.  
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where these have a smaller effect on EMP, in all likelihood due to the same reason given 
above.      
 
Table 3a - Summary of EGARCH-M Estimation Results - Mean Equation 
 Variables ANG CV GB MOZ STP 
Risk-return 
relationship 
 Estimated return (%) 
(annual equivalent) 
-3.59** 
(-43.08) 
-0.23** 
(-2.76) 
-0.05** 
(-0.60) 
-0,11* 
(-1.32) 
-1.58** 
(-18.96) 
Effect of 1% increase 
in domestic credit (%) 
lag(-1) 
0.47* 
 
lag(-8) 
0.35* 
lag(-4) 
5.81** 
lag(-4) 
0.61** 
lag(-6) 
3,60** 
 
lag(-9) 
3,20** 
lag(-8) 
0.48** 
 
lag(-11) 
0.90**  Economic 
fundamentals  
Effect of 1% real 
exchange rate 
depreciation (%) 
lag(-4) 
-28.05** 
 
lag(-7)  
-15.35** 
lag(-3) 
-18.96** 
lag(-7) 
-4.65** 
lag(-3) 
-23,79** 
 
lag(-8) 
-38,95** 
-- 
D_ER_LIB 1.27** -- -- -- -- 
D_R_SHIFT 0.45** -- -- -- -- 
D_AID_CONCENT -- -- -- 0.10** -- 
D_05_97 -- -- -0.01** -- -- 
D_08_97 -- -- -- -0.08** -- 
Dummies 
D_12_97 -- -- -- -- -0.10** 
Time Trend  - 0.002** -- -- -- -- 
Note: (--) not applicable due to lack of data or relevance. A double (single) asterisk indicates that the 
estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% (5%) level.  
 
We also find evidence of the risk-return relationship but it differs across countries rather 
significantly. While GB has the lowest estimate 0.60% p.a., the estimates CV and MOZ’s 
estimates are of a close order of magnitude, as a 1% increase in volatility is associated with 
a reduction in mean EMP of 2.76% and 1.32% p.a. respectively. In contrast, the risk-return 
relationship in ANG and STP is clearly more extreme, as our estimates imply that holders of 
these countries assets would respectively expect to be compensated by a 43.08% and a 
18.96% p.a. EMP reduction for the same increase in volatility.  
 
The estimates for dummy variables provide additional insight into mean EMP dynamics. The 
liberalisation of ANG's exchange rate on 2002:12 (dummy D_ER_LIB), possibly coupled with 
other foreign exchange-market policy management mechanisms introduced around this 
period, lead to a strong AOA depreciation and significant positive EMP. In addition, during 
1999:05, an unexplained and large reduction in ANG’s foreign reserves, which fell from 
741.26 to 375.55 million USD, increased EMP (dummy D_R_SHIFT). The same occurs when 
the MZM depreciates in 2005:04/05 (dummy D_AID_CONCENT), thereby partially reversing 
the currency’s appreciation streak that resulted from the concentration of donors payment 
arrears at the end of 2004. GB’s entry to the WAEMU, agreed upon in 1996:12 but only 
effective as of 1997:05, is clearly associated with a reduction in EMP volatility (dummy 
D_05_97) and so is MOZ’s substantial reduction in interest rates in 1997:07 (dummy 
D_8_97). In the case of STP, an inspection of its exchange rate data suggests that some sort 
of “regime change” takes place toward the end of 1997, which marks the end of period of 
relatively large STD depreciations (dummy D_12_97). The respective dummy’s estimate 
12 
confirms this intuition, as it indicates that this “regime change” effectively lowered EMP as of 
1998:01. There is no evidence of time trend behaviour with the exception of ANG, where the 
estimated coefficient is significant but has a very small magnitude.  
 
Table 3b - Summary of EGARCH-M Estimation Results - Variance Equation 
 Variables ANG CV GB MOZ STP 
Changes in  
domestic credit  
lag(-3) 
-0.10** 
lag(-3) 
-25.91** 
lag(-3) 
  -2.86** 
lag(-2) 
-3.31** 
 
lag(-3) 
-1.27** 
lag(-3) 
-0.36**  
Changes in  
real exchange 
rate 
 -- 
lag(-1) 
-19.97** --  --   -- 
Changes in  
foreign reserves -- 
lag(-4) 
2.20** 
 
lag(-8) 
3.86** 
lag(-2) 
2.13** 
lag(-1) 
11.30** 
 
lag(-12) 
10.39** 
 
lag(-6) 
-1.48* 
 
lag(-8) 
2.39** 
Economic 
Variables  
Changes in oil 
prices 
lag(-4) 
4.23** -- -- -- -- 
D_08_97 -- -- -- -2.42** -- 
D_12_97 -- -- -- -- -3.29** 
D_10_99  -1.76** -- -- --  
Dummies 
D_06_01  -- -- -- -- -2.86** 
Asymmetric 
Leverage 
Effect  
 0.44** -0.71** -- 0.66** -- 
Time Trend  0.02** -0.03** -- 0.02** 0.04** 
Notes: (--) not applicable due to lack of data or relevance. A double (single) asterisk indicates that the 
estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% (5%) level.  
 
Addressing the conditional variance, we find that increases in domestic credit are always 
associated with lower volatility. This effect seems to be more pronounced in CV, GB and 
MOZ, as was also the case for mean EMP, and is less pronounced in ANG and STP. Real 
exchange rate changes have the same effect but only for CV. Foreign reserve changes 
generally increase volatility with the exception of ANG, where changes oil prices have the 
same impact.26 Evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks on volatility is found for ANG, CV 
and MOZ while negative shocks increase volatility more that positive ones only for CV. The 
absence of the last effect for GB is again probably due to the reason earlier. 
 
Various structural breaks are also found to be associated with lower volatility: 1999:10 
(ANG), 1997:08 (MOZ), 1997:12 and 2001:06 (STP). Some of these breaks appear to be 
associated with known economic events. For instance, the break identified for MOZ in 
1997:08 in all likelihood reflects the introduction of the Maputo inter-bank offered rate 
(MAIBOR) during the previous month, which fell substantially from 35.80% to 13.35%. With 
the exception of GB, time trend variables are significant for PALOP countries, which 
                                                          
26
 STP presents mixed results as foreign reserve changes decrease volatility at lag 6 but increase it at lag 8. 
13 
suggests that our model of conditional volatility will benefit from the inclusion of other 
economic variables should these become available.   
 
Finally, we look at the conditional volatility series resulting from our model estimations in 
order to determine whether our initial finding that countries with currency pegs have lower 
volatility is confirmed. In Figure 3, we again group countries according to their exchange rate 
regime but now include MOZ in both in order to facilitate comparisons. Overall, we confirm 
this finding and the ordinal ranking that emerges from observing unconditional volatility 
(Figure 2). Moreover, two additional observations can be made. First, “pre-peg” CV and MOZ 
exhibit similar volatility prior to 1999. CV’s currency peg has had markedly lower volatility 
since then, with the exception of 2000. Since 2002, this difference has been accentuated as 
MOZ’s volatility has increased further. While the reason for this is unclear, this change might 
reflect the economic aftermath of the 2000-1 floods that severely affected MOZ. Second, 
STP’s volatility level has declined since 2002 and is now much closer to that of MOZ, which 
has the managing float with the lowest conditional volatility.  
 
 
Figure 3a - EMP Conditional Volatility (% p.a.) 
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Figure 3b - EMP Conditional Volatility (% p.a.) 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Our main conclusion is that PALOP countries with currency pegs clearly have lower volatility 
when compared to those with managed floats. Moreover, EMP crises under pegs are much 
less severe. We find that economic fundamentals correctly account for mean EMP for all 
countries. The response of mean EMP to changes in domestic credit, however, is greatest in 
CV and MOZ, which apparently suggests that conditions in monetary and exchange rate 
markets for these countries are closely related. While the evidence is not as strong for GB, 
this is possibly due to the fact that this country is the only one in our sample which formally 
belongs to a monetary and currency union having the same legal tender for its members.  
 
We also find that the risk-return relationship is much more favourable for investors under 
currency pegs, as the increase in volatility is lower for the same rate of (EMP) return. The 
exception to this finding is MOZ, which apparently has a risk-return profile akin to that 
enjoyed by countries with pegs. A plausible reason is that MOZ has the only managed float 
in our sample implementing monetary and exchange rate policy within the confines of an IMF 
framework, which establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for the central 
bank’s net domestic assets. This intuition needs to be tested, however, and as such is 
included in our future research agenda.  
 
EMP conditional volatility, meanwhile, is generally driven by changes in domestic credit 
(lowers it) and foreign reserve changes (raises it). The first effect is more pronounced under 
currency pegs, but also under MOZ’s managed float. Evidence of asymmetric effects of 
shocks on volatility is found for ANG, CV and MOZ while “bad news” increase volatility more 
that “good news” only for CV’s currency peg, which we take to be a further sign of its 
credibility.  
 
A few striking cross-country comparisons also emerged in our analysis. We find that ANG 
has the most severe EMP crises whilst MOZ has the least severe among countries with 
managed floats. STP, meanwhile, lies between these two extremes but its EMP crises 
behaviour is clearly much closer to that of MOZ. Our econometric models also permit us to 
rank PALOP countries’ conditional volatility in ordinal terms. Based on these findings, it 
appears that MOZ’s managed float has the greatest credibility for such arrangements as it 
has lowest volatility while ANG has the highest. STP’s credibility may also be improving since 
its volatility has declined as of 2002 and its level is now much closer to that of MOZ. 
 
Our future research agenda seeks to refine the above insights by seeking more data and 
better institutional knowledge for PALOP countries. This will allow us, for example, to fully 
explore crises episodes and structural breaks, and then relate these to policy and institutional 
changes. We also plan to undertake a comparative analysis using multivariate techniques, 
which might be instructive in terms of better policy design in the future. Hopefully, the 
techniques developed for this undertaking will also allow us to investigate other cases of 
interest in Africa, such as the CFA arrangement and the South African Rand’s monetary 
zone. 
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APPENDIX  – Country Files 
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ANG – EMP Estimates & Crises  
 
 
 
 
ANG – EMP Descriptive Statistics  
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ANG – EGARCH-M Estimation Results  
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ANG – Data Description27 
Variables 
 
et 
Bilateral AOA/USD exchange rate.  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics 
∆et Depreciation rate of AOA vis-à-vis the USD (log). 
∆rt 
Change in ANG’s international reserves (log).  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it 
ANG 3-Month Deposit Rate (%). 
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it* 
USA 3-Month CDs (secondary market), an average of dealer bid rates on 
nationally traded certificates of deposit (%). 
Source: US Federal Reserve. 
∆(it - it*) Change in interest rate differential (%). 
pt ANG Consumer Price Index. Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆pt ∆pt = (pt  - pt-1)/pt-1 
pt* 
US Consumer Price Index. 
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics - All Urban Consumers - (CPI-U) U.S. city 
average. All items 1982-84=100. 
∆pt* ∆pt* = (pt*  - pt-1*)/pt-1* 
q
 t Real exchange rate depreciation = ∆e - ∆pt + ∆pt* 
dc
 t  
Domestic credit growth rate. 
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆dc
 t ∆dc t = (dc t  - dc t -1)/dc t -1 
oil
 t 
Crude Oil (Petroleum), Simple Average Of Three Spot Prices; Dated Brent, West 
Tx Intermediate, & The Dubai Fateh, USD per Barrel – World.  
Source: Wood Mackenzie. 
∆oil
 t ∆oil t = (oil t - oil t-1)/oil t-1 
D_10_99 Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t ≥ 1999:10 and zero otherwise. 
ER_LIB Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t = 1999:05 and zero otherwise. 
D_ER_SHIFT Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t = 2002:12 and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
Unit Root Test:  
 MacKinnon Critical Values  
Significance 
Level 
No Intercept or 
Trend Intercept 
Intercept and 
Trend 
1% -2.5830 -3.4861 -4.0373 
5% -1.9426 -2.8857 -3.4478 
10% -1.6171 -2.5795 -3.1488 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 The data used in the analysis are monthly and the sample period runs from 1996:01 until 2005:09. Where 
appropriate, ∆ denotes percentage changes between two consecutive months, which are calculated using the 
exact formula or log difference approximation (excepting interest rate data). 
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ANG – Phillips-Perron Test Statistic 
Series Level Test Specification 
First 
Difference Test Specification 
pt -1.219924 Intercept & Trend -4.870490** Intercept & Trend 
pt* -0.382614 Intercept & Trend -4.732785** No Intercept or Trend 
et -2.456632 Intercept & Trend -8.137548** No Intercept or Trend 
it-it* -3.757466** Intercept & Trend -10.97336** No Intercept or Trend 
rt  -0.731256 Intercept & Trend -11.03994** No Intercept or Trend 
dct -2.032350 Intercept & Trend -11.61337** No Intercept or Trend 
oilt -0.252769 Intercept & Trend -10.25041** No Intercept or Trend 
Notes: The Phillips-Perron procedure tests the null hypothesis of a unit root. All tests were 
conducted using four lags. A double (single) asterisk indicates that the test statistic is significant 
at the 1% (5%) level. 
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ANG – Country Overview28  
 
Angola’s monetary authority is the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA, National Bank of Angola 
in English) and the national currency is the Kwanza (AOA). From the BNA’s webpage the 
exchange rate on 21.8.07 was of 74.784 AOA/USD according to the available information on 
the Central Bank. The Kwanza was introduced after the independence of ANG from Portugal 
substituting the Angolan Escudo entering circulation on the 8th of January 1977, even though 
the emission date of some of the currency was 1976. On the 25th of September 1990 the 
New Kwanza (AON) was introduced, then on 1st of July 1995 the readjusted Kwanza (AOR) 
and on the 1st of December 1999 the Kwanza (AOA) as we know it.  
 
In March 1999 the government started implementing a programme to ensure conditions for 
economic development and mitigate the negative impact of resumption of the domestic 
conflict from 1998-1999. Therefore, since May 1999 the BNA, has floated the kwanza, 
created an interbank foreign exchange market, liberalized foreign exchange purchase for 
imports as well as established commercial banks interest rates, and to allow for indirect 
monetary control, created central bank bills. Several steps towards opening the economy 
were made such as reducing the level and number of import tariff rates and domestic 
subsidies on fuel prices were eliminated. According to the IMF’s (PIN) No. 05/85 July 6, 
2005, on September 2003 the authorities started implementing what is known as the strong 
kwanza policy and in order to implement this policy, according to the before quoted source, 
absorption of domestic liquidity was performed through central banks sales of foreign 
reserves, tightening in the monetary policy along with improvements in fiscal control and 
domestic debt sales. Altogether it resulted in a considerable reserves shortfall that soon 
recovered by 2004 and 2005. In fact it is visible on the series that starting on September 
2003, for 3 consecutive months the Kwanza appreciates and from December onwards the 
fluctuation was considerably lower than before this policy shift.  
 
ANG had a GDP of 13.825 million USD in 2003 and 838 USD per capita according to the 
Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05/85, July 6. Following on the World Bank’s (WB) 
country brief August 2007, 12 month inflation was of 12.2% in December 2006, when 
according to the IMF 10% was targeted. The country has been struggling to contain inflation, 
in 1998 the country had 135% and reached 330% in 1999 (IMF’s (PIN) No. 00/62, August 10) 
due to increase of hostilities in 1998 and 1999. The authorities endured in a Staff Monitored 
Programme (SMP) from April – December 2000 and by June 2001 inflation was of 175% 
even though 150% was programmed on a January-June 2001 SMP based on the Preliminary 
Conclusions of the IMF Mission, August 14, 2001. This divergence was a result of excessive 
foreign borrowing and public spending. However after the peace process of 2002, inflation 
fell from 106% to 31% in 2004, reaching 12.2% in 2006. The strong export performance 
along with the strong kwanza policy set the ground for the inflation reduction. 
 
On April the 4th of 2002, the Angolan armed forces and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed an agreement to end the 27-year long civil war. The 
months that followed witnessed a rapid demobilization and the beginning of the resettlement 
of ex-combatants across the country, in the context of a government-led initiative that was 
supported by various UN agencies and the World Bank. The country in general, and 
especially the government are very dependent on oil revenue whether we speak of foreign 
                                                          
28
 Information Source: Public Information Notice No. 05/85 - July 6, 2005; No. 03/114 - September 10, 2003; No. 
00/62 - August 10, 2000. 
Angola -2007 Article IV Consultation Preliminary Conclusions of the Mission, Luanda June 6, 2007  
Angola -006 Article IV Consultations - Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission - March 29, 2006 
Angola - 2002 Article IV Consultation - Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF mission – Feb. 19, 2002  
Angola - Article IV Consultation - Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission August 14, 2001 
Angola - Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies - April 3, 2000 
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reserves harness or public revenue having reached around 80% in 2001, and no less than 
75% in both 2002 and 2003. Regarding IMF’s ANG—2007 Article IV Consultation Preliminary 
Conclusions of the Mission, June 6, the country’s challenges lie in starting to use a non oil 
primary deficit to ensure macroeconomical sustainability and to protect the government from 
oil price float instability. In 2006 the non oil primary fiscal deficit moved to 50.8 from 61.5 in 
2005 % of non oil GDP, due to a less than 50% of governmental programmed expenditure 
executed. Moreover Sonangol, the public oil company, was estimated to manage US$660 
million on behalf of the government at end 2004. 
 
The public external debt to exports ratio has been falling considerably from 365.5 in 2002 to 
112.8 in 2004 while the public external debt service to exports was of 141.1 in 2002 and 
reached 23.4 in 2004. Public debt weight is decreasing, commercial surplus is increasing, 
foreign reserves augmenting and the government knows that on the following years 
revenues will have a constant upward trend. The challenge will lie on the prudence of fiscal 
policy and how it will contribute to long term capacity building. The more the government 
remains dependent on oil revenue the higher is the risk regarding long term sustainability. 
Recently there has been an upward trend in oil price and production along with an increase 
in diamond prices in 2005, projections on the IMF’s, ANG—2007 Article IV Consultation 
Preliminary Conclusions of the Mission Luanda June 6, say that by 2010 oil production will 
be 90% above 2005, which represented already an 81% increase in value from 2004. This 
would imply, according to the same report, an estimated GDP average growth of 13% during 
2007-2010 and public oil revenues would almost double from 2005 to 2010 even considering 
an oil price fall from the long-term trend. 
   
The country has a commercial surplus due to oil and diamond exports which we will address 
more in detail on the following paragraph. In 2002 the country had a 150.1 million dollars 
commercial deficit and reached a 5137.9 surplus in 2005. Even though oil exploitation is 
likely to increase and prices to remain high in the next years, it does not ensure long term 
sustainability if the revenues are not used carefully. The oil revenue inflow represents the 
country’s opportunity to invest in training and skill improvement (human capital) as well as to 
purchase and build the infrastructures (Physical Capital) to a long term economic 
development. Using BNA’s available data on exports and imports from 2002-2005, oil and 
diamonds accounted on average for more than 99.00% of the exports. Oil is the most 
representative good with 91.34% (out of total exports of 8.530.40 Million USD) in 2003 and 
94.79% in 2005, which amounted to 22583.2 Million USD. This is a consequence of price as 
well as production increase. The diamond sector has been increasing in value but losing 
weight in total exports, while representing 8.29% in 2003 and a value of 788.1 US Million 
dollars, it moved up to 1092 Millions Dollars and 4.53% of total in 2005. The main partners of 
ANG’s oil exports in 2004 were the USA 31.40% and China 29.83%, although the US 
accounted for 42.61% in 2000 while China 19.31%29.  
 
Following on Paul Collier (May, 2006), ANG’ strong natural resources revenue may give 
room for what is called in the literature the Dutch Disease, which in the short run, due to a 
agricultural sector growth of 26% in 2006 according to the  World Bank’s (WB) country brief 
of August 2007, we are inclined to discard. However, it may well be a temporary pick up that 
in fact, is the result of the return of the domestic conflict dislocated, that returned after 2002. 
Notwithstanding it will be of relevance to monitor progression on the production factors cost 
increase. The Council of Ministers adopted in 2007 a reserve fund for oil where the 
difference between the world price for ANG's oil and the budgeted oil price (US$45 in 2007) 
will be automatically channelled. It may constitute an important step in avoid excess liquidity 
in the economy as well as make discretionary use of oil revenue less tempting. 
 
                                                          
29
 Presented as the percentage of total oil exports in that given year. 
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CV – EMP Estimates & Crises  
 
 
 
 
CV – EMP Descriptive Statistics  
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Series: EMP_EURO
Sample 1996M01 2005M09
Observations 117
Mean      -0.054409
Median  -0.017172
Maximum  4.862051
Minimum -5.312469
Std. Dev.   1.463486
Skewness  -0.297722
Kurtosis   6.751392
Jarque-Bera  70.33402
Probability  0.000000
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CV – EGARCH-M Estimation Results  
 
321134
2ln
−−−−
++ tttt2t10t εξεξε+qθ+∆dcθ+θ+σµ=EMP  
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
µ
 
-0.002277 0.000386 -5.897669 0.0000** 
   
θ0
 
-0.024604 0.004236 -5.809010 0.0000** 
θ1
 0.058132 0.019334 3.006672 0.0026** 
θ2
 
-0.189549 0.040841 -4.641149 0.0000** 
1ξ  -0.138642 0.054641 -2.537328 0.0112* 
2ξ  0.166011 0.043016 3.859268 0.0001** 
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λ0
 
-7.968517 0.288702 -27.60115 0.0000** 
λ1
 
-19.57058 7.308292 -2.677860 0.0074** 
λ2
 
-25.91903 2.776526 -9.335060 0.0000** 
λ3
 2.198588 0.329649 6.669473 0.0000** 
4λ  3.858875 0.411063 9.387552 0.0000** 
5λ  
-0.027584 0.004062 -6.789853 0.0000** 
α1
 0.591598 0.200617 2.948892 0.0032** 
γ1
 
-0.705408 0.107218 -6.579214 0.0000** 
Diagnostics  
  
  
L-B Standardised 
Residuals L-B Squared Residuals ARCH-LM Statistic 
Lag Q p-value Q2 p-value LM p-value 
Lag3 1.6805 0.195 3.2580 0.071 0.023585 0.8099 
Lag4 1.8140 0.404 3.9167 0.141 -0.062074 0.5390 
Lag5 1.8140 0.612 3.9216 0.270 0.041375 0.6311 
Lag6 3.7235 0.445 3.9216 0.417 -0.080680 0.4229 
Lag7 5.0334 0.412 3.9491 0.557 0.031201 0.8111 
Lag8 5.0407 0.539 4.1989 0.650 -0.071455 0.6091 
Lag9 5.5784 0.590 4.2108 0.755 -0.067852 0.4711 
Lag10 6.0199 0.645 5.2979 0.725 -0.128773 0.1187 
Lag11 7.1475 0.622 5.6028 0.779 -0.046155 0.7623 
Lag12 7.8967 0.639 5.9442 0.820 -0.043482 0.6835 
Lag13 7.9255 0.720 6.1949 0.860 -0.075333 0.4101 
Lag14 7.9256 0.791 6.4396 0.892 -0.061972 0.4485 
 
No. of Observations Log-Likelihood SIC 
 117 350.2359 -5.8238 
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CV – Data Description 
Variables  
et 
Bilateral CVE/EUR exchange rate.  
Source: Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV). 
∆et Depreciation rate of CVE vis-à-vis the EUR (log). 
∆rt 
Change in CV’s international reserves (log)   
Source: BCV. 
it 
CV 3-Month Deposit Rate (%).  
Source: BCV. 
it* 
Eurozone 3-Month Deposit Rate (%).  
Source: European Central Bank. 
∆(I t- it*) Change in interest rate differential (%). 
pt CV Consumer Price Index.  Source: BCV. 
∆pt ∆pt = (pt  - pt-1)/pt-1 
pt* German Consumer Price Index  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank. 
∆pt* ∆pt* = (pt*  - pt-1*)/pt-1* 
q
 t Real exchange rate depreciation = ∆e - ∆pt + ∆pt* 
dc
 t 
Domestic credit.  
Source: BCV. 
∆dc
 t ∆dc t = (dc t  - dc t -1)/dc t -1 
D_1_99 Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t ≥ 1999:01 and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
CV – Phillips-Perron Test Statistic 
Series Level Test Specification 
First 
Difference Test Specification 
pt -3.087410 Intercept & Trend -10.75042** No Intercept or Trend 
pt* -2.383996 Intercept & Trend -11.04016** No Intercept or Trend 
et -3.261669*** Intercept & Trend -15.70297** No Intercept or Trend 
it-it* -1.747065 Intercept & Trend -10.40285** No Intercept or Trend 
rt -1.239519 Intercept & Trend -12.31291** No Intercept or Trend 
dct -2.899659 Intercept & Trend -9.234167** No Intercept or Trend 
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CV – Country Overview 30 
 
As of January 1999, the Cape Verdian Escudo (CVE) has been pegged to the Euro at the 
nominal exchange rate of 110.27 CVE/EUR. The CVE was first issued on July 1, 1977 by the 
Banco Central de Cabo Verde (BCV), the country’s central bank. At that point in time, the 
CVE was pegged to a basket of currencies following its unlinking from the Portuguese 
Escudo (PTE) in the wake of the latter’s depreciation. The CVE was again pegged to PTE at 
a rate of 0.50 CVE/PTE following of the signing of the Acordo de Cooperação Cambial 
(Exchange Cooperation Agreement) between CV and Portugal on March 13, 1998. Prior to 
the agreement becoming operational in July 1998, the CVE was devalued to the rate of 0.55 
CVE/PTE on March 30, 1998. 
 
As for CV’s economy, Weber (2005) finds that the main economic and financial indicators 
reveal a strong performance in terms of real and nominal growth with a GDP of 1.036,4 
millions USD (1.930,2 USD per capita) in 2005 using figures from the Banco de Cabo Verde. 
CV has enjoyed high economic growth, low inflation and generally favourable 
macroeconomic conditions. The fiscal slippages that occurred in 2000 were not repeated 
subsequently, and the government has formally recognised the need to consolidate 
monetary and fiscal policy through the adoption of the Maastricht criteria as reference values. 
Foreign reserves have increased gradually since 1999, large attributable to increased foreign 
grants and, since 2001, less expansionary fiscal policies.  
 
The analysis of CV’s balance of payments situation, reveals that the existence of a structural 
account deficit. The trade deficit has been relatively unchanged since 1996, at roughly 35-
37% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which mainly reflects CV’s dependence on imports, 
most of which are from the Eurozone, Portugal 48.64% on average during 1996-2006 and 
from the Netherlands 15.03% for the same period. Indeed, such imports have increased 
more than five fold in value during the period 1990-2003, and from 52.9% to 77.7% of total 
imports. Exports, meanwhile, are mostly directed at Portugal, whose share has risen from an 
average of 65.9% during 1990-97 to an average of 82.72% during 1998-2004; after 2004 the 
share drops below the 70% threshold. More recently Portugal represented 51.55% of total 
                                                          
30
 Information Source: IMF Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies - February 22, 2000 
30 
exports in 2005, and 53.23% in 2006, while Spain represented 21.32% and 27.31% for the 
same period.  
 
The financial account exhibits near zero portfolio investment, indicative of the fact that CV 
currently engages in little trading in international financial and capital markets. In addition, 
there is low foreign direct investment (FDI) and some capital inflows in the form of foreign 
loans. The geographical distribution of emigrant’s remittances is skewed towards Euro 
transfers, which make up almost 70% of total remittances. Needless to say, the importance 
of these remittances for CV is paramount as the current exchange rate regime is difficult to 
sustain without substantial monetary transfers by private individuals. Indeed, remittances are 
the major channel through which the BCV’s interest rate policy attracts foreign capital and, as 
such, they are instrumental in sustaining the peg. As a result, CV’s monetary authorities have 
sought to improve the peg’s credibility in order to attract these private transfers. 
 
As for the economic impact of the peg itself, Weber (2005) finds that the exchange rate 
anchor has lead to benefits such as lower inflation and price volatility, a steady build-up of 
foreign reserves and an increased degree of integration with the Eurozone, as evidenced by 
the changes in CV’s trade pattern and the geographical distribution of remittances. The peg’s 
impact on price stability is also reflected in the depreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate, which is tantamount to a rise in external competitiveness.  
 
Weber (2005) notes, however, that these benefits come at the cost of having to leave 
domestic interest rates high so as to attract foreign capital, which inhibits private investment 
and economic growth somewhat. Based on his analysis, he concludes that CV’s prevailing 
currency peg is capable of reaping more economic benefits, some akin to those only 
achievable under full Eurosation, given its significant room for manoeuvre and scope for 
further improvement.  
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GB – EMP Constituent Components 
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GB – EMP and Changes in Exchange Rate (%)  
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GB – EMP Estimates & Crises  
 
 
 
 
GB – EMP Descriptive Statistics  
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Series: EMP_EURO
Sample 1996M01 2005M09
Observations 117
Mean      -0.011675
Median   0.089224
Maximum  3.118420
Minimum -2.898738
Std. Dev.   0.726165
Skewness   0.103766
Kurtosis   10.38594
Jarque-Bera  266.1512
Probability  0.000000
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GB – EGARCH-M Estimation Results  
 
74
2 DUMMYln
−− t2t1t qθ+∆dcθ++σµ=EMP + tε  
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
µ
 
-0.000536 8.62E-06 -62.25163 0.0000** 
D_5_97 
-0.006708 0.000206 -32.63759 0.0000** 
θ1
 0.006067 0.001566 3.874420 0.0001** 
θ2
 
-0.046472 0.002107 -22.05940 0.0000** 
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λ0
 
-13.58991 0.005822 -2334.153 0.0000** 
λ1
 
-2.856574 0.609767 -4.684695 0.0000** 
λ2
 2.130448 0.320162 6.654273 0.0000** 
α1
 1.698640 0.055331 30.69965 0.0000** 
2α  -0.355731 0.001158 -307.1049 0.0000** 
3α  0.182010 4.36E-05 4177.698 0.0000** 
Diagnostics  
  
  
L-Bo Standardised 
Residuals L-B Squared Residuals ARCH-LM Statistic 
Lag Q p-value Q2 p-value LM p-value 
Lag1 1.4940 0.222 0.6428 0.423 -0.093768 0.2277 
Lag2 1.4985 0.473 1.9863 0.370 0.119513 0.4922 
Lag3 1.5744 0.665 2.4040 0.493 0.074359 0.4551 
Lag4 3.8546 0.426 2.9722 0.562 -0.050547 0.5907 
Lag5 4.7447 0.448 2.9826 0.703 -0.000852 0.9926 
Lag6 6.9611 0.324 3.2093 0.782 0.066816 0.4312 
Lag7 7.0170 0.427 3.2186 0.864 0.053219 0.5359 
Lag8 7.5428 0.479 3.3680 0.909 0.057482 0.4945 
Lag9 7.5534 0.580 3.3731 0.948 0.009046 0.9030 
Lag10 9.5067 0.485 5.9059 0.823 -0.177390 0.0272 
Lag11 11.055 0.439 5.9071 0.879 -0.040061 0.5147 
Lag12 11.245 0.508 7.2679 0.839 0.140196 0.4831 
 
No. of Observations Log-Likelihood SIC 
 117 426.6483 -7.3980 
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GB – Data Description 
Variables  
et 
Bilateral GBW/EUR exchange rate.  
Source: Calculated using data from http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory 
∆et Depreciation rate of GWB vis-à-vis the EUR (log). 
∆rt 
Change in GB’s international reserves (log).   
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it 
GB 3-Month Deposit Rate (%).  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it* 
Eurozone 3-Month Deposit Rate (%).  
Source: European Central Bank. 
∆(it - it*) Change in interest rate differential (%). 
pt GB Consumer Price Index.  Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆pt ∆pt = (pt  - pt-1)/pt-1 
pt* German Consumer Price Index.  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank. 
∆pt* ∆pt* = (pt* - pt-1*)/pt-1 
q
 t Real exchange rate depreciation = ∆e - ∆pt + ∆pt* 
dc
 t 
Domestic credit.  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆dc
 t ∆dc t = (dc t - dc t -1)/dc t -1 
D_5_97 Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t ≥ 1997:05 and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
GB – Phillips-Perron Test Statistic 
Series Level Test Specification 
First 
Difference Test Specification 
pt -3.656467** Intercept -10.50532** No Intercept or Trend 
pt* -2.383996 Intercept & Trend -11.04016** No Intercept or Trend 
et -4.275929** Intercept -13.06109** No Intercept or Trend 
it-it* -1.32507 Intercept & Trend -8.621472** No Intercept or Trend 
rt -3.129516 Intercept & Trend -10.57881** No Intercept or Trend 
dct -1.418726 Intercept & Trend -13.62803** No Intercept or Trend 
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GB – Country Overview 31 
 
GB’s national currency was the Peso (GWP) until its entrance to the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The country signed its entry into the WAEMU in December 
1996 while the official conversion of the Peso (GWP) into CFA francs (XOF) took place on 
the 2nd of May 1997, nowadays the exchange rate between the CFA and the EURO is of 
655.957 under the fix peg. This implies that the country delegates the rule and execution of 
the monetary policy to an authority, Banque des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), Central 
Bank of the Western African States, that manages it at a regional level altogether for GB as 
all the other member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo. 
 
Following on Veyrune (2007) the Franc zone is a result of the cooperation between France 
and 15 African countries established in 1972 through the conventions de cooperation. This 
cooperation takes place between the French treasury, the WAEMU, Central Africa Economic 
Monetary Community (CAEMC) and the Comoros that established a fix peg towards the 
French Franc and implicitly, later on to the Euro. The exchange rate arrangement involves 6 
central banks: the Banque de France, responsible for the French monetary policy, Institut 
d’Emission d’Outre-Mer (IEOM) and Institut d'émission des départements d’Outre Mer 
(IEDOM), two monetary institutions that depend on French authorities that are responsible 
for the French franc overseas, the Banque des Etats d’Afrique Centrale (BEAC), the 
(BCEAO) and the Central Bank of the Comoros.  
 
Not all members are former French colonies such as GB and Equatorial Guinea and vice-
versa, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco to name a few. This cooperation main feature is the 
French Treasury’s unlimited contingency credit line that allows these institutions to signal 
credibility and sustain the peg even though requiring fewer foreign reserves. Even though the 
acronym CFA is the same, the agreements were undertaken and are executed separately, 
the CAEMC CFA stands for “Coopération Financière en Afrique” and the CFA for WAEMU 
for “Communauté Financière Africaine”. When France joined the Euro, EU Commission 
                                                          
31
 Information Source: Public Information Notice No. 06/99 - August 17, 2006; No. 04/138 - December 10, 2004; 
No. 99/94 - October 8, 1999; No. 98/20 - March 26, 1998; No. 97/34 - July 25, 1997. 
IMF Country Report No. 05/94 - March 2005; No. 05/69 - March 2005; No. 03/70 - March 2003; No. 01/193 -
October 2001 
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declared the compatibility of these agreements on the 23rd November 1998, in Bank of 
France’s webpage. 
 
The country followed a centrally planned economy after its independence in 1974, having 
suffered from a high external debt, inefficient public enterprises, and stagnating economic 
growth. Highly dependent on foreign aid, public debt constitutes a heavy burden that was 
about 339.1% in 1996 and of 317% in 2006. Following on the Bank of France’s report, GB 
had in 2005 a 192 USD GDP per capita while inflation was at 1.6% in 2006, IMF’s (PIN) No. 
06/99. Structural reforms toward a market-oriented economy in the mid-1990s were 
supported by a SMP 1993-1994 and under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) 1995-1998. This period, according to the IMF (PIN) No. 98/20 March 26, was marked 
by a good economic performance with real annual GDP growing 4.33% on average during 
1994-1997. The large depreciations of the peso in 1996 were related high price level along 
with speculation regarding the terms of accession of GB in the WAEMU. Inflation was 
increasing from 1994 until 1996 reaching 66% but dropping in 1997 to 16.2%. 
 
In spite of a period marked by a good economic growth, an armed conflict arose in 1998-99 
that lead to widespread destruction. In 1999 and 2000, the Fund assisted the authorities' 
post-war reconstruction effort through Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) and in 
the beginning of 2000 a new government had taken office. On December 2000 a new 
poverty reduction and growth facility had been approved. After the conflict, important 
structural reforms were abandoned being the main political focus, power consolidation. The 
outcome was that by 2001 the programme started going off track, having the staff given up 
by mid2002 and finally having expired by 2003. As a consequence of not obeying by the 
agreements with the IMF, debt relief stopped after 2001 which accrued pressure on its weak 
financial stability. Real GDP growth in 2000 was of 7.6%, and according to (PIN) No. 06/99 
August 17, it went to 0.2% in 2001 and -7.1% in 2002. Inflation remained low with a period 
average of 2.93% during 1999-2003, having peaked in 2000 with 8.6%. 2003 marked the 
inversion of the tendency on real GDP growth in spite of a shut of -0.6%. 
 
In spite of the inversion of 2003, with the aggravation of the economic conditions, a deficient 
fiscal management and public sector wage delays opened the way for a pacific military coup 
that deposed President Kumba Yala. Parliamentary elections were held in March 2004 while 
an interim President was settled until the June-July 2005, time when the country went to the 
poles electing João “Nino” Vieira. As a result of the conflict only one of the three operating 
banks is in business and in only Bissau. Not surprisingly the country denotes low financial 
intermediation considering regional standards. The government progressed well in our time 
frame, moving from a current primary fiscal balance deficit of 3.3% in 1994 into a surplus of 
5.5% (of GDP) in 1997. To this result tariff, taxes modernization and simplification, 
contributed to improve the fiscal machine. This progress got somewhere lost due to the 
conflicts that were responsible for donor’s fund demobilization32, loss of public administrative 
ability altogether with a large wage increase in 2000 after the conflict. In the period during 
1999-2003 the average primary fiscal balance deficit was of -6.54%, being the most 
noticeable -8.4% in 1999 and -11.1% in 2000. In 2004 the deficit reached -7.6% but it has 
been recovering to -3.6% in 2006. The situation improvement in 2005, according to the 
Banque de France – Rapport Zone Franc 2005, was due to tighter fiscal control, 
centralisation of expenses authorization and closure of public bank accounts outside the 
Central Bank. The next few years will be an opportunity to continue to profit on higher 
stability and regain some of the policy achievements of the before 1997. The country’s public 
external debt is one of the highest, 339.1% of the GDP in 1996. However, as a result of the 
                                                          
32
 Namely: demobilization and re-insertion of ex-soldiers (PDRRI) and clearance of domestic supplier arrears 
(DASP). 
37 
mild economic pick up after 2004, the situation got relatively better, 418% in 2002 to 317% of 
the GDP in 2006. 
 
When looking into the commercial balance, the country is close to being a mono-exporter of 
cashew nuts accounting for 85% of total export revenue and 12% of the world production in 
2005. Its commercial balance was of -33 millions of USD on average between1994-1997. 
Export/import performance, using the Banque de France – Rapport Zone Franc 2005, from 
2002-2005 was of 93.1%, 99.7%, 91.3% and 83.1% respectively. The situation in 2003 was 
exceptionally marked by an export increase along with imports stagnation. In 2005 cashew 
nuts sales increased 16.5% and even though exports increased 30%, as imports augmented 
43.2%, the trade deficit deteriorated from a deficit of 2,493 to 6,953 thousand euros. In fact 
the country has a chronicle commercial deficit as it needs to import capital goods, 
consumption goods such as medicine and the export sector has not been ensuring sufficient 
and sustainable revenue to cope with the needs. Economic activity has been recovering 
since 2004-2006 on a 3.3% real GDP growth having each year growing at a higher rate than 
the one before. Along with growth, inflation is also picking up reaching positive levels in 2005 
and 1.6% in 2006. A new SMP was set into place between April-December 2005 as 
economic activity exceeded expectations.  
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MOZ – EMP Estimates & Crises  
 
 
 
 
 
MOZ – EMP Descriptive Statistics  
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Sample 1996M01 2005M11
Observations 117
Mean      -0.069004
Median   0.294741
Maximum  12.84318
Minimum -19.84583
Std. Dev.   4.313411
Skewness  -1.119534
Kurtosis   8.230905
Jarque-Bera  157.8320
Probability  0.000000
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MOZ – EGARCH-M Estimation Results  
tttt1tttt1t εEMPξ+EMPξ+EMPξqθqθ∆dcθ+∆dcθ++σµ=EMP ++++ −−−−−−− 432218433926
2 Dummiesln
 
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
µ
 
-0.001111 0.000408 -2.720960 0.0065** 
D_AID_CONC 0.095706 0.013277 7.208212 0.0000** 
D_8_1997 -0.083265 0.020951 -3.974368 0.0001** 
1θ  0.036008 0.006675 5.394406 0.0000** 
2θ  0.032004 0.005957 5.372645 0.0000** 
3θ  -0.237890 0.072678 -3.273214 0.0011** 
4θ  -0.389466 0.080988 -4.808910 0.0000** 
1ξ  0.171410 0.056766 3.019601 0.0025** 
2ξ  0.271044 0.067864 3.993912 0.0001** 
3ξ  0.247548 0.029615 8.358759 0.0000** 
1
1
1
1
51241332
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D_8_97 
-2.421679 0.425431 -5.692299 0.0000** 
λ0
 
-7.405693 0.366634 -20.19912 0.0000** 
λ1
 
-3.307525 0.606509 -5.453378 0.0000** 
λ2
 
-1.272954 0.468581 -2.716614 0.0066** 
3λ  11.29571 3.171785 3.561309 0.0004** 
4λ  10.39159 1.984151 5.237297 0.0000** 
5λ  0.027186 0.004597 5.914081 0.0000** 
α1
 0.230000 0.150110 1.532214 0.1255 
γ1
 0.662871 0.122989 5.389698 0.0000** 
Diagnostics  
  
  
L-B Standardised 
Residuals L-B Squared Residuals ARCH-LM Statistic 
Lag Q p-value Q2 p-value LM p-value 
Lag4 3.0904 0.079 0.7990 0.371 -0.016112 0.8938 
Lag5 3.7874 0.151 0.8002 0.670 0.002794 0.9824 
Lag6 4.1964 0.241 0.8612 0.835 -0.009189 0.9192 
Lag7 4.2347 0.375 1.2024 0.878 0.045356 0.7130 
Lag8 4.2788 0.510 1.2220 0.943 -0.067660 0.4516 
Lag9 4.6136 0.594 2.4725 0.872 -0.114566 0.2387 
Lag10 4.9034 0.672 2.5249 0.925 -0.085440 0.3958 
Lag11 4.9066 0.768 2.7913 0.947 0.024275 0.7777 
Lag12 5.2214 0.815 3.1857 0.956 -0.090433 0.3921 
Lag13 5.2710 0.872 4.3555 0.930 -0.055324 0.6045 
Lag14 5.4720 0.906 4.3555 0.958 0.003271 0.9771 
Lag15 5.5001 0.939 5.9249 0.920 0.203304 0.1424 
 
No. of Observations Log-Likelihood SIC 
 117 253.9199 -4.034581 
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MOZ – Data Description 
Variables  
et 
Bilateral MZM/USD exchange rate.  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics 
∆et Depreciation rate of MZM vis-à-vis the USD (log). 
∆rt 
Change in MOZ’s international reserves (log).  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it 
MOZ 3-Month Deposit Rate (%).  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it* 
USD America’s 3-Month CDs (secondary market), an average of dealer bid rates 
on nationally traded certificates of deposit (%).  
Source: US Federal Reserve. 
∆(it - it*) Change in interest rate differential (%). 
pt MOZ Consumer Price Index.  Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆pt ∆pt = (pt  - pt-1)/pt-1 
pt* 
USA’s Consumer Price Index.  
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics - All Urban Consumers - (CPI-U) U.S. city 
average. All items 1982-84=100. 
∆pt* ∆pt* = (pt*  - pt-1*)/pt-1* 
q
 t Real depreciation rate = ∆e - ∆pt + ∆pt* 
dc
 t  
Domestic credit growth rate.  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆dc
 t ∆dc t = (dc t  - dc t -1)/dc t -1 
D_8_97 Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t ≥ 1997:08 and zero otherwise. 
D_AID_CONCENT Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t = 2005:04/5 and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
MOZ – Phillips-Perron Test Statistic  
Series Level Test Specification 
First 
Difference Test Specification 
pt -1.160281 Intercept -7.134658** No Intercept or Trend 
pt* -0.382614 Intercept & Trend -4.732785** No Intercept or Trend 
et -1.772598 Intercept & Trend -4.800054** No Intercept or Trend 
it-it* -2.321646 Intercept & Trend -10.88693** No Intercept or Trend 
rt -2.811424 Intercept & Trend -11.63864** No Intercept or Trend 
dct -1.951027 Intercept & Trend -13.10733** No Intercept or Trend 
 
 
 
43 
MOZ 
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
% Domestic Credit Change
 
 
MOZ 
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
% REER Change
 
 
 
MOZ – Country Overview 33 
 
The Republic of Mozambique’s monetary authority is the Banco de Moçambique (BM), Bank 
of Mozambique, and the national currency Metical (MZM) which was introduced in June 1980 
and on the 1st of July 2006 the new metical was presented dividing the former metical for 
1000, for which the exchange rate of the MTN/USD is of 25.71 on the 10.9.07 according to 
the available information on the Central Bank. Being one of the poorest countries in the 
world, the Mozabiquean authorities have been working with the IMF in several ways in order 
to pursue macroeconomic stability and financial credibility. The programmes the authorities 
followed with the IMF intend to promote growth, low inflation, accumulation of foreign 
reserves and make available resources to fight poverty. The country is very dependent on 
foreign aid which accounted for half of the governments’ expenditure in 2003. A long way 
                                                          
33
  Information Source: Press Release No. 07/135 - June 18, 2007; No. 06/289 - December 18, 2006; 05/282 - 
December 19, 2005; No. 05/149 - June 22, 2005; No. 05/27 - February 11, 2005; No. 04/120 - June 21, 2004; No. 
00/73 - December 19, 2000; 97/28- June 24, 1997, 96/33 - June 21, 1996. 
Press Information Notice (PIN) No. 98/33 - April 30, 199 
News Brief No. 02/48 - June 17, 2002;  01/93 - September 20, 2001 
IMF Country Report No. 06/254 - July 2006; No. 03/288 - September 2003 
African Economic Outlook AfDB/OECD 2005 
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was been covered and the World Bank country brief June 2007, identifies MOZ as a strong 
economic and social performer in Africa. 
 
According to the IMF during the period between 1987 to 1995 in spite of controversies such 
as the war and natural disasters, a long way has been covered to consolidate the market 
economy and there was an average annual growth of 6.7%. In 1996 the first 3 year 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) was approved in recognition of the before 
mentioned efforts while in 1997, about one year after the beginning of the programme, the 
IMF stated “commendable achievements” by the country’s policy. Moreover, the executive 
boards of the IMF and the World Bank, after their preliminary discussions, recognized that 
MOZ qualified for assistance under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt 
Initiative in September 1997 (having been approved by April 1998). Performance on the late 
decade has remained strong and is likely to continue, according to the World Bank Country 
Brief 2007, the economy grew 8% on an annual average between 1996 and 2006. In 2004, 
according to the National Institute of Statistics the country had a GDP per capita of 313 USD. 
 
On what exchange rate policy is concerned, according to the Fund, by 1996 liberalization of 
exchange rates, prices, interest rates and trade policies were close to completion and in 
1997, the Bank of Mozambique and the six major commercial banks signed an agreement in 
order to establish the Maputo Inter-Bank Offered Rate (MAIBOR); having been signed in 
June it was officially implemented in July of the same year. The floods that affected the 
country in 2000 and 2001 showed, on a revealed preference basis, that maintaining foreign 
reserves was a priority to the other channels through which pressure can be relieved, 
depreciation of the Metical and interest rate differential increase. Additionally, after the 
massive floods episode, interest rates differential has been reduced consistently to former 
levels. The IMF Press Release No. 04/120, June 21, stated that the local authorities have 
been implementing an informal fix peg to the USD since half of 2002. In fact, in late 2004 
there was a concentration of donors’ payments in the last four months of the year which 
resulted in an excessive appreciation of the MT versus the USD. The identified crisis in April 
and May 2005 support the peg thesis as they are a consequent readjustment of the metical 
versus the USD as documented by the African Development Bank and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development report, Joint Perspective for Africa 2004/2005. 
 
Regarding prices, following on Press Release No. 98/35 August 25, Money and credit (in 
percent of opening M2) fell by -27.2% in 1996, moved from 33.8% in 1994 to an 2.3% in 
1997 and consequently CPI fell from 63.1% in 1994 to 6.4% in 1997. In 1999 inflation remain 
on 6.2%, Press Release No. 00/73 December 19. The massive floods of 2000 and 2001 
unleashed inflationary pressure, mostly in 2001 for which monetary policy tightening was 
required. In 2002 inflation was considerably lowered from over 20% in 2001 to below 10%. A 
positive signal of the authorities’ achievement was the fact that together with foreign direct 
investment, economic growth resumed in 2001. Inflation since 2002 has been on average 
around 10%. The strong economic growth that the country has been experiencing is a source 
of inflationary pressure but is closely monitored by a prudent monetary policy. 
 
The government has been working closely with the IMF binding their fiscal performance to 
the programme targets. Using the fiscal data available on the Central Bank of Mozambique’s 
webpage, the fiscal deficit without accounting for donors’ funds has been of 18.34% on 
average between 1998 and 2006. Moreover the average weight of current expenditure over 
total expenditure is of 50.92% 1998-2006. From 1999 till 2004 this balance had been 
aggravating and by 2005 total revenue was sufficient to sustain current expenditure with a 
balance just over 0 having further improved in 2006. Authorities after the monetary policy 
broader achievements were encouraged to pursue fiscal management and sustainability 
improvement in order to continue the strong economic performance. Computer software to 
manage accountability and procedure improvement has been at the heart of the efforts. The 
45 
net present value of total public external debt outstanding has been decreasing from 4308.334 
in 1995 to 691.4 in 1997 and 96.0 in 2002. The fact that the GDP has been growing and 
exports as well is generous to this indicator although it also shows that debt is progressively 
loosing weight having into reference the country’s income and resources. 
 
To address the commercial balance we use the data available on the webpage of the Central 
Bank of Mozambique. The country has been maintaining a situation of trade deficit with a 
yearly average of 491.37 millions of USD from 1995-2006, although the weight of Exports on 
Imports has been increasing through time, from an annual average of 31.08% in 1995-2000 
to 73.62% 2001-2006. The increase in exports was a result of the known “Mega Projects” 
such as aluminium and in spite of the underlying import increase (capital goods for instance), 
since 2001 the “Mega Projects” commercial balance has been consolidating and increasing a 
surplus. These projects have been boosting exports representing 70.92% of their total in 
2006. 
 
                                                          
34 This refers to publicly guaranteed debt after rescheduling, which is expressed as a percentage of three-year 
export average. 
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STP – EMP Estimates & Crises  
 
 
 
 
STP – EMP Descriptive Statistics  
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Mean       0.431140
Median   0.925789
Maximum  24.06257
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Skewness  -0.495508
Kurtosis   5.335611
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Probability  0.000000
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STP – EGARCH-M Estimation Results  
  222118
2 DUMMYln
−−−−
+ ttt1t2t1t εξε+EMPξ+∆dcθ+∆dcθ++σµ=EMP  
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
µ
 
-0.015778 0.001181 -13.36239 0.0000** 
DUMMY 
(d_12_97) -0.100697 0.009560 -10.53324 0.0000** 
θ1
 0.004815 0.001550 3.107102 0.0019** 
θ2
 0.009001 0.001437 6.263291 0.0000** 
ξ 1
 
-0.820385 0.052763 -15.54838 0.0000** 
2ξ  0.857573 0.054739 15.66662 0.0000** 
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D_12_97 -2.859691 0.641670 -4.456639 0.0000** 
D_6_01 -3.285768 0.469490 -6.998586 0.0000** 
λ0
 
-8.379134 0.802998 -10.43482 0.0000** 
λ1
 
-0.358151 0.052207 -6.860237 0.0000** 
λ2
 
-1.482998 0.618503 -2.397722 0.0165* 
λ3
 2.392812 0.841404 2.843834 0.0045** 
4λ  0.035233 0.009529 3.697295 0.0002** 
α1
 0.814423 0.156087 5.217762 0.0000** 
2α  -0.594424 0.062765 -9.470581 0.0000** 
Diagnostics  
  
  
L-B Standardised 
Residuals L-B Squared Residuals ARCH-LM Statistic 
Lag Q p-value Q2 p-value LM p-value 
Lag3 2.0558 0.152 2.9084 0.088 -0.034395 0.7137 
Lag4 3.5552 0.169 3.0871 0.214 -0.090009 0.3061 
Lag5 3.5827 0.310 3.5895 0.309 0.157226 0.3461 
Lag6 4.2890 0.368 5.8949 0.207 -0.041139 0.7874 
Lag7 5.7630 0.330 7.1629 0.209 -0.129071 0.0563 
Lag8 7.1623 0.306 7.5241 0.275 0.155879 0.1869 
Lag9 9.4233 0.224 7.5989 0.369 0.104902 0.3420 
Lag10 9.6555 0.290 9.8810 0.273 -0.003631 0.9732 
Lag11 11.385 0.250 9.9344 0.356 -0.102794 0.3163 
Lag12 11.387 0.328 9.9642 0.444 -0.217494 0.0069 
Lag13 11.408 0.410 10.035 0.527 -0.029446 0.7454 
Lag14 13.778 0.315 10.172 0.601 -0.081835 0.4781 
 
No. of Observations Log-Likelihood SIC 
 117 161.6857 -2.464568 
Notes: The parameters are as defined in the main text. A double (single) asterisk indicates that 
the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% (5%) level.  
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STP – Data Description 
Variables  
et 
Bilateral STD/USD exchange rate.  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics 
∆et Depreciation rate of STD vis-à-vis the USD (log). 
∆rt 
Change in STP’s international reserves (log).  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it 
STP3-Month Deposit Rate (%).  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
it* 
USD 3-Month CDs (secondary market), an average of dealer bid rates on 
nationally traded certificates of deposit (%).  
Source: Source: US Federal Reserve. 
∆(it - it*) Change in interest rate differential (%). 
pt STP Consumer Price Index.  Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆pt ∆pt = (pt  - pt-1)/pt-1 
pt* 
US Consumer Price Index.  
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics - All Urban Consumers - (CPI-U) U.S. city 
average. All items 1982-84=100. 
∆pt* ∆pt* = (pt*  - pt-1*)/pt-1* 
q
 t Real exchange rate depreciation = ∆e - ∆pt + ∆pt* 
dc
 t  Domestic credit growth rate. Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics. 
∆dc
 t ∆dc t = (dc t  - dc t -1)/dc t -1 
D_12_97 Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t ≥ 1997:12 and zero otherwise. 
D_6_01 Dummy variable that takes on value one for all t ≥ 2001:06 and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
STP – Phillips-Perron Test Statistic 
Series Level Test Specification 
First 
Difference Test Specification 
et -4.386125** Intercept  -8.847658** No Intercept or Trend 
it-it* -1.967276 Intercept & Trend -10.58118** No Intercept or Trend 
rt -4.263279** Intercept & Trend -11.17796** No Intercept or Trend 
dct -2.548944 Intercept & Trend -11.66125** No Intercept or Trend 
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The responsible authority for the monetary policy is the Banco Central de São Tomé e 
Príncipe, Central Bank of STP while the national currency is the Dobra (STD) since 1977, 
being the exchange rate on the 10.9.07 of 18,885.45 STD/EURO according to the available 
information on the Central Bank. The economy is very dependent on external assistance, 
tourism and monoculture of cocoa production. The most recent challenges have been oil 
management, containing inflation and increasing the real GDP while strengthening public 
management and further pursue of privatizations. Using figures from the Central Bank the 
country had a GDP of 505.4 USD per capita in 2006. 
 
Under an IMF SMP, the local authorities were commended for their policy performance in 
order to stabilize the economy in 1998-1999 after a decade of considerable 
macroeconomical imbalances, IMF Press Release No. 00/33 April 28. Tight monetary and 
fiscal policies based on a market exchange rate regime delivered a primary fiscal balance 
surplus of 1.3% of GDP in 1999 from a deficit of 2.2% in 1997 and inflation fell from 81% in 
1997 to 13% in 1999.  The spread between the official exchange rate and the black market 
ratio was reduced from 6.5% in 1997 to 1.5% in 1999. A 3 year (2000-02) Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF) was approved in April 2000. The programmes STP pursued with 
the IMF are concerned at delivering an adequate and stabilising exchange rate policy, while 
building solidly on foreign reserves, prudent monetary policy in order to prevent inflationary 
pressure and discretionary policy use while making resources available to fight poverty.  
 
On the fourth quarter of 2000 and throughout the first three quarters of 2001, policy 
implementation went of track as fiscal slippages took place, which resulted into a primary 
budget deficit of 2.1% of GDP in 2001, compared with a targeted surplus of 2.7% under the 
program. Although monetary policy remained tight in 2000-01, the budget deficit caused net 
bank credit to the government to exceed its quantitative performance criteria in December 
2000 and June 2001.  
 
The public deficit accentuated in 2003 due to the expansion of spending, situation which is 
believed to be related with the expectation of signing the first oil exploitation contract which in 
the end did not take place. The overall fiscal deficit had been aggravating from 2002 till 2004 
while in 2005 the situation improved as deficit reduction was met even not accounting for the 
oil signature bonus. The Executive Board of the IMF approved in August 2005 a three year 
PRGF mounting up to SDR 2.96 million (40% of the quota) for STP. This programme is to 
allow financing of the government’s programme for 2005-2007. More recently, STP economic 
growth stood in 2004 around 4% as did in the preceding year. Inflation accentuated 
throughout the year reaching 15.2% in 2004, 17.4% in 2005, when in the preceding period of 
2000-2003, in stood around a yearly average of 9.43%. The opening of 3 new commercial 
banks in 2004 made credit concession more than double increasing inflationary pressure. 
The external as the public accounts deteriorated.  
 
In May 2000 STP got a re-scale of the debt burden under the terms of Naples until the 
verification of the completion point36 of the HIPC initiative. STP reached the decision point 
                                                          
35
 Information Source: Press Release No. 07/142 - June 25 2007; No. 07/52 - March 16, 2007; No. 07/5 - January 
17, 2007; No. 06/44 - March 7, 2006; No. 05/187 - August 5, 2005; No. 00/74 - December 20, 2000; No. 00/33 - 
November 2006 
Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 02/17 - February 28, 2002 
News Brief No. 00/119 - December 19, 2000 
São Tomé—Letter of Intent, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding - January 9, 2002 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies for 2000 - March 24, 2000 
IMF Country Report No. 07/102 - March 2007; No. 06/400 - November 2006; No. 06/349 - October 2006, No. 
06/329 - September 2006; No. 02/30 – February 2002; No. 00/66 – May 2000   
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under the enhanced HIPC Initiative in December 2000. The net present value of total 
external debt in % of government revenue, has been over 6 times the government’s revenue, 
mildly improving from 693.2% in 2002 to 619.7% in 2005, IMF Press Release No. 05/187 
August 5.   
 
STP, using information of the Central Bank’s webpage, the balance of payments has been 
aggravating its deficit since 1998 till 2005 and, on average, 75% of the deficit came from the 
commercial imbalance. The import average coverage from 1999 till 2006 is of 10.94%, which 
means that only 10.94% of the imports are paid by the exports. The country is also a mono-
exporter as cacao represents 69.78% of total exports in weight. However the country has oil 
reserves that are expected to boost exports. Geographically wise Portugal is the largest 
import partner with 57.07% in 2005 and 67.15% in the first trimester of 2007; ANG is the 
second with a 20.11% average from 2005 till the first quarter of 2007. As for exports the 
Netherlands and Portugal represented 77.15% in 2005 and 60.37% in 2006.   
  
Oil management will be under the responsibility of the Agencia Nacional do Petroleo de São 
Tomé e Príncipe (ANP-STP), the National Agency for Oil of São Tomé e Príncipe which 
responds to the government and operates under its guidance. Drilling was announced to 
start on July 2008 in the joint Economic Exclusive Zone reserves with Nigeria. The “Fundo 
Permanente do Petróleo”, the Permanent Oil Fund will be an important tool for the 
macroeconomic stability of the country. It will constitute further insurance for a non 
discretionary use of oil revenue while preventing excess liquidity in the economy. This issue 
has been on the agenda of the cooperation between the government of STP and the present 
International Institutions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
36
 Completion point – is the time at which the country has proven adequate use of the debt relief, by achieving 
pre-settled objectives, and is given the final and definitive debt pardon. 
